Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 21
Issue 3 Issue 3 - 1988

Article 4

1988

A Brief Rejoinder
Anthony D'Amato

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony D'Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 Vanderbilt Law Review 489 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol21/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

A Brief Rejoinder
Anthony D'Amato
Professor Weisburd's reply to my essay adds helpful insights to the
fascinating issue of the impact of treaties upon customary international
law. For the most part, I think the positions on both sides have been
clearly drawn, leaving to the reader the ultimate judgment on the merits.
One instance where the position is not so clearly drawn, however, is
the question of what custom-creating force we can find in a treaty that
itself disavows its custom-creating force. If the language says that the
treaty is a matter of comity only, Professor Weisburd argues that the
treaty cannot give rise to a customary rule of law. My position to the
contrary is that the parties cannot in this way carve out for themselves
an exception to the general metarule that treaties generate custom, any
more than they could effectively use treaty language to confine the treaty
rule to themselves by saying, in the treaty, that their particular treaty
shall have no general customary law-creating force for nonparties. In
neither case do the parties have a general legislative competence that
extends to nonparties.
I want to take issue with Professor Weisburd's contention that "those
asserting that torture is forbidden are the ones asserting the existence of
a rule, and it is therefore up to them to show that there exists consistent
practice supporting that rule."' Why not just the opposite? Why not
place the burden on those who assert that torture is allowed, and ask
them to come up with a rule supporting their position? Surely there is
nothing in the words of this or any other formula that places the burden
of justification on one party or the other.
Professor Weisburd might answer, as he does in his Reply,2 that there
is a presumption in favor of a state's power to act. But then what about
a state's power to refrain from acting? Is there a presumption in favor of
that as well? If a ship in distress signals a coastal state for assistance, is
there a presumption in favor of the coastal state's inaction? Of course,
the answer to all of these questions turns on whether another state's

1. Weisburd, A Reply to ProfessorD'Amato, 21
(1988).
2. Id. at 10-11.
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right has been violated, which is the same as asking whether there is a
rule governing the situation. Yet, this is precisely the question with
which we began. I object to the attempt to answer the initial question by
resorting to a presumption (in favor of action or inaction) which can
only be dealt with if the initial question has been answered.3
Moreover, we should never begin with the question, "What is the legal rule?" The real world does not come to us in the form of legal rules
or questions about legal rules; rules are only our interpretations of the
facts of the real world. We should instead question what states are doing
and who is being harmed. Out of harm (economic or physical) come
conflicts; out of conflicts come conflict resolutions; and out of conflict resolutions come inferences about the operative rules of customary law. If
someone is being tortured, a harm plainly exists. Should we remain
blind to that harm because the torturer has a license from the state?
Why does a state license solve the problem of torture for Professor Weisburd? Why does he consider it his "job" to say that the state license
solves the problem? Despite the fact that his Reply has contributed to
our understanding of the general issues, I have the feeling that these
more basic questions remain unanswered.

3. I present these arguments in a slightly different way in my book on custom, other
portions of which Professor Weisburd has cited. See A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-86 (1971).

